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Abstract 
A model of packaging waste management is presented to explore the policy options 
available to governments to implement waste regulation in light of the Extended 
Producer Responsibility (EPR). Our model endogenises the packaging design as an 
additional determinant for the overall amount of waste jointly with consumers’ sorting 
effort and producers’ output decisions. The model shows that the policies that yield the 
first-best allocation may not find public support. Further, if the set of available policy 
instruments is limited, production and consumption of the good is likely to settle on a 
sub-optimal level even though the optimal allocation may be achievable. Finally, the 
model demonstrates that a landfill tax may actually increase landfill waste in the 
presence of tradable credits for recycling activities. The results shed light on some 
shortcomings of existing regulatory schemes such as the Producer Responsibility 
Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations of the UK. 
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1 Introduction 
Waste management regulations motivated by the principle of Extended Producer 
Responsibility (EPR) -- i.e., the idea to hold producers responsible for products 
throughout their entire life cycles -- are intended to stimulate choices by the regulated 
producers that will reduce pollution generated by their products.  The (EU) Council 
Directive 94/62/EC sets the minimum recovery and recycling targets for packaging 
waste for the EU member states, with the intention of motivating the regulated parties to 
reduce packaging waste.  An EPR-driven packaging waste regulation requires producers 
to either treat (dispose or recycle) the packaging waste used for their products, or 
contract out the treatment to reprocessors and bear the cost.  After more than a decade 
of implementing the required corresponding legislations at the national level, there are 
signs that the original intention is bearing fruit.  For example, WRAP (2011) and 
WRAP (2012) report over one hundred case studies of so-called Courtauld 
Commitments 1, 2 and 3 in the UK grocery sector.  Signatories are brand owners, 
manufacturers and retailers of household products who committed themselves to reduce 
packaging waste.  Most of these studies report packaging design and method changes 
made by producers, resulting in a reduction in the use of packaging material.  
Previous studies show that the first-best (socially optimal) waste management 
outcome can be characterised by a combination of a waste charge for consumers and an 
advanced disposable fee for producers or a recycling subsidy for consumers (e.g., 
Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; Shinkuma, 2003).1  
As these papers, our study analyses the optimal policy strategies to implement 
waste management regulations but departs from them in several ways.  First, in order to 
                                                          
1 An advanced disposal fee means producers must pay a fee per unit of the product (and hence waste) 
produced and sold in anticipation of the resulting waste. 
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capture EPR-motivated packaging waste management regulation we use a model that 
specifically incorporates and jointly determines three key choice variables: producers’ 
packaging design effort, households’ sorting effort, and output and consumption 
decisions.  The vast majority of the previous literature, as cited above, endogenises 
some of these variables, but not all.  However, all three variables are critical 
determinants of the amount of waste in reality.  The overall amount of waste in our 
model therefore results from the decisions on these variables.2   
Second, we take into account that policy solutions need not only be optimal but 
also politically feasible.  In reality, policy makers may face difficulties in implementing 
theoretically optimal policies, for example, due to high administration costs or statutory 
barriers.  But even optimal policy solutions that do not involve such problems may not 
end up on the political agenda.  Politicians who are anxious about their re-election 
prospects will be wary of policies that are unlikely to attract public support.  Any policy 
solution intended to implement EPR-driven waste regulation needs to comply with the 
general public’s notion of producer responsibility to win sufficient political support.  
This dimension of the policy problem may lead to a serious additional challenge for 
policy makers.  
Third, we evaluate the policy maker’s options if not all policy instruments 
considered in our (general) theoretical analysis are available.  This step is suggested by 
existing waste regulation as implemented, for example, in the UK.   
Fullerton and Wu (1998) were among the first to address green design formally 
and spawned a by now considerable literature.  They analyse the efficiency restoring 
                                                          
2 In related research streams, the relation between packaging design and waste reduction is studied from 
different angles. For example, Aydinliyim and Pangburn (2012) point out that low-waste packaging may 
be inconvenient for consumers and require a compensating price discount. They show that an optimally 
chosen discount can lead to less waste while increasing profit and consumer surplus at the same time. 
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policy response to various market failures.  They show that, in the presence of the most 
common market failures, a subsidy to product recyclability or a subsidy to recycling by 
consumers in combination with other instruments such as a tax on packaging can yield 
the optimal outcome.  Our model is related to theirs, but as opposed to their approach, 
we explicitly model sorting as an effort that causes disutility for households to capture 
that, in reality, waste reduction by households hinges critically on the time and energy 
spent on sorting through their waste to separate out recyclables.  The volume of 
recycling then emerges through the interplay of sorting by households and packaging 
design choice by producers.  Choe and Fraser (1999) point out how the explicit 
integration of household waste reduction effort into a model that is related to the 
approach by Fullerton and Wu can undermine previous conclusions.  They show that 
the disutility associated with waste reduction gives households an incentive for illegal 
waste dumping that may countervail the incentive to reduce waste induced by 
downstream instruments such as a waste collection charge.3   
Further work by Calcott and Walls (2000, 2005) also considers the product 
design (or product material mix) and ask which combinations of upstream and 
downstream instruments can implement an efficient “design for the environment” and 
                                                          
3 The focus of the work by Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Choe and Fraser (1999) is on market failures due 
to the externalities of waste generation or failures that preclude the formation of a private market for 
recycling.  Admittedly, they (and large part of the literature) do not consider that households may derive 
utility from home sorting despite the costs in terms of time and inconvenience and even if a central 
facility was available (Czajkowski, Kadziela and Hanley, 2014).  Czajkowski, Hanley and Nyborg (2015) 
analyse different motivational drivers for sorting.  They suggest that moral or intrinsic motivations play 
an important role in explaining households’ willingness to sort.  This suggests that the effectiveness of 
policy measures as discussed in the literature and also in this paper may differ substantially across sorters.  
Some households may only weakly react to fees or subsidies but respond rather strongly if their moral 
duty of engaging in recycling activities is emphasised instead. 
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thus, recycling.4  Yet, again, these studies do not endogenise households’ sorting 
effort.5  
Our model yields some disconcerting findings.  First, policy makers may find it 
difficult to gain public support for both types of policy combinations that can yield the 
first-best allocation.  The first policy solution is unlikely to satisfy the notion of an 
EPR-based regulation that the public is likely to hold because the solution requires 
subsidising producers without holding them physically or financially responsible for the 
cost of waste management at the end of their products’ life cycles.  The second policy 
solution may be perceived as unethical because the solution requires subsidising 
consumption (or production) of a polluting product.  This argument carries over to our 
second finding.  If downstream policy instruments such as a waste collection charge or a 
recycling subsidy are not available, the policy maker may be unable to achieve her 
recycling target unless she is willing to resort to the politically controversial measure of 
subsidising a polluting product.  Finally, our analysis also points to a possible counter-
intuitive relationship between a landfill tax and landfill waste.  An increase in the 
landfill tax may actually give rise to more landfill waste because the resulting higher 
volume of recycling activities generates a counterproductive effect.  An increase in the 
landfill tax rate spurs recycling activities, which, in the presence of a mandatory 
packaging waste recycling target that is implemented through a system of tradeable 
recycling certificates as in the UK, results in a decrease in the costs for producers 
associated with recycling.  However, this beneficial effect may be counteracted by the 
                                                          
4 “Green design” can refer to the disassembly properties, weight, material mix and, as in this paper, the 
packaging design. 
5 Aalbers and Volleberg (2008) model households as having to exert a separation effort to produce near- 
homogeneous waste streams suitable for recycling but do not incorporate design improvements into their 
model. They conclude that a deposit-refund system provides optimal incentives for recycling and legal 
waste disposal.  
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adverse incentive that lower recycling (production) costs have on producers’ design 
efforts and household consumption.  In the end, the overall amount of packaging waste 
may increase.  These results shed light on some shortcomings of existing regulatory 
schemes such as the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) 
Regulations of the UK.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents the 
model and the first-best solution.  The optimal policy mixes are derived in section 3 and 
the impact of the package design choice on the results is analysed.  In sections 4 and 5 
the model is adapted to reflect some features of existing waste regulations.  Limitations 
regarding the available set of policy instruments and the effect of a landfill tax are 
examined.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The model and first-best solution 
The model considers three types of agents: consumers, producers of the packaged good, 
and the policy maker.  The first-best solution is achieved when the policy maker 
maximises social welfare by choosing the three key variables: households’ sorting effort 
x, 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 1, producers’ packaging design effort z, 0 ≤ 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 1, and output and 
consumption of the packaged good q.   
   
{ }x, z , q
Max   W  =  U(q) + ω − C(q) − F(z)q − [G(x) + γ (1 − x) + dx](1 − z)q. 
U(q) is a concave utility function.  The parameter ω denotes the consumer’s 
endowment/income.  C(q) is the convex cost function of producing the packaged good.  
Given producers’ packaging design z, (1 − z)q represents the total packaging waste for a 
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given output level q.6  For simplicity, this expression also represents the total material 
used for packaging.  F(z) represents the cost of packaging design per output unit and is 
assumed to be convex.  G(x) represents the sorting disutility and is also assumed to be 
convex.  Producers’ packaging waste reduction/design effort z and consumers’ sorting 
effort x jointly determine the amount of packaging waste to be recycled.  x(1 − z)q 
represents packaging waste to be recycled, at the unit cost d, whereas (1 − x)(1 − z)q 
represents the remaining waste that incurs the social cost of γ per unit, comprising per-
unit waste management cost and negative externalities per unit waste.  By assumption, γ  
> d.     
Our model is based on the assumption of homogenous consumer preferences.  
Neither the utility function nor the endowment vary between households.  Czajkowski, 
Kadziela and Hanley (2014) and Czajkowski, Hanley and Nyborg (2015), however, 
show that hourseholds typically show a large heterogeneity in preferences towards 
home sorting (see footnote 3).  Random utility models offer ways to extend the model 
and incorporate preference heterogeneity.  These models give rise to a variety of 
econometric specifications to analyse discrete choice decisions such as the decision to 
engage in recycling activities.7  
                                                          
6 This expression, namely, waste reduction as a percentage of output, is consistent with the way 
packaging waste reductions are reported in various studies. 
7 Preferences are modelled based on utility functions that include a deterministic component and a 
stochastic element to capture unobserved attributes or drivers for choice (Manski 1977, McFadden 1973).  
Different assumptions about the distribution of the stochastic element give rise to different choice models 
that link preferences to stated choices.  Recent developments such as the Random Parameters model 
(McFadden and Train, 2000) and the Generalised Multinomial Logit Model (Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, and 
Wasi, 2010) provide flexible frameworks to integrate preference heterogeneity and therefore offer 
additional benefits to the researcher compared to the more restrictive traditional Multinomial Model 
(McFadden, 1973).  Other approaches that have been used in the literature to represent preference 
heterogeneity in the stated choice context include latent class models and models that incorporate 
preference heterogeneity in the random utility component (Bhat, 1997). 
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The policy maker’s optimum {x*, z*, q*} is given by the following set of first-
order conditions: 
∴  G′ (x*)  =  γ  − d       (1) 
∴  F′ (z*)  =  G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + dx*    (2) 
∴  U′ (q*)  =  C′ (q*) + F(z*) + [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + dx*](1 − z*)  (3) 
Condition (1) balances out the marginal social cost and benefit of consumers’ sorting 
efforts.  Condition (2) implies that the marginal social cost of packaging waste 
reduction should be balanced against the marginal social benefit of lower sorting effort, 
the reduced costs of waste management, and recycling.  Condition (3) equates marginal 
social cost and benefit in the product market.  The corresponding amount of recycled 
packaging waste is x*(1 − z*)q*. 
In the case of a regulation-free environment, the representative producer 
maximises profit π  =  pq − C(q), where p is the market-given output price.  This yields 
p = C′ (q*).  Using a quasi-linear utility function, the representative consumer 
maximises u = U(q) + ω − pq, where ω is the budget.  This leads to p = U ′ (q*).  
Obviously, without any regulation the optimal choice of the sorting effort level (x) by 
consumers and packaging design effort level (z) by producers are x = z = 0 since they 
are costly activities.8 
In what follows, we will analyse which waste management policy strategies can 
implement the first-best allocation.  For this purpose, the model incorporates four policy 
instruments.  τ  denotes a waste charge (post-sorting if consumers pay; pre-sorting if 
                                                          
8  We implicitly assume the type of local environments as seen in the UK, where local governments are in 
charge of the collection of residual waste and recyclables, the disposal of the former and processing of the 
latter, either by themselves or by hiring private firms.  The costs of waste management incurred by the 
local governments are financed through the general Council Tax.  Issues potentially relevant to the 
recycling markets such as imperfect competition and illegal dumping by the reprocessors are outside the 
scope of this study.  
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producers pay), while φ is the sorting subsidy per unit of sorted recyclable.  t denotes 
the product tax per unit of q consumed.  Finally, s denotes the consumption subsidy per 
unit of q.  Although this is equivalent to a negative product tax, a different variable is 
used for notational clarity.   
 
3 Model solution 
3.1 Fixed packaging design 
As discussed above, the joint determination of packaging design, sorting effort and 
consumption decisions has received little attention so far in the existing literature on 
waste regulation policies.  Yet, all three elements influence the overall amount of 
waste and can be used as targets for economic policy interventions.  Policy solutions 
proposed in previous work may therefore be in need of re-evaluation.  In order to 
illustrate this, we will first follow the majority of the literature in treating the 
packaging design as exogenously given and derive and evaluate the optimal policy 
solutions under this assumption.  In the next subsection, the packaging design will 
then be integrated into our model as a choice variable for producers. 
Disregarding the packaging design as a choice variable can be represented in 
our model by assuming that the policy maker imposes z = z* on producers.  To render 
our results comparable to the literature the policy maker is assumed to influence the 
consumers’ and producers’ decisions through a waste charge τ per unit of waste that 
can be collected from either party (denoted as τD or τS), and a sorting subsidy to 
consumers φ per unit of recyclables sorted.  
The producer’s optimisation problem is now expressed as 
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{ }q
Max  π  =  pq − C(q) −F(z*)q − τS(1 − z*)q 
which yields 
p  =  C′ (q) + F(z*) + τS(1 − z*).     (4) 
The consumer now faces the following problem: 
{ }q, x
Max  u  =  U(q) + m  − G(x)(1 − z*)q 
s.t.   pq + m + τD(1 − x)(1 − z*)q =  ω + φ x(1 − z*)q 
which yields  
 G′ (x)  =  τD + φ      (5) 
and 
p  =  U′ (q) − [τD(1 − x) − φ x + G(x)](1 − z*).  (6) 
By setting τD + φ = γ − d the policy maker can induce consumers to choose the 
optimal sorting effort level x* as given by Condition (1), equating the marginal social 
cost of sorting with its marginal benefit.  This result, derived under the assumption of 
an invariant packaging design, corresponds to previous findings in the literature.  For 
example, studies by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995), Shinkuma (2003), and Ino (2011) 
imply that, in an ideal world (i.e., no illegal dumping) with recycling possibilities, the 
first-best outcome is characterised by τD + φ  =  marginal external cost (MEC) of 
waste disposal.  In our model, the MEC of waste disposal includes both the social cost 
of waste disposal and the reprocessing cost that would not be taken into account in a 
regulation free environment by either producers or consumers.  
 The optimal policy condition τD + φ = γ − d implies that consumers can be 
induced to choose the sorting effort level x* (and hence q*, as shown in the Appendix) 
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by more than one combination of the available policy instruments τD and φ.  An 
overview is given in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Case 3-1a is likely to be perceived by many as being fully in line with the spirit 
of the EPR.  Consumers receive the sorting subsidy φ = γ − d per unit of recyclables 
sorted, and producers pay the waste charge τD = γ per unit of (gross) waste produced.  A 
recycling subsidy combined with an advanced waste disposal fee essentially is a 
deposit-refund system (Palmer et al., 1997). 
In case 3-1b, consumers receive no subsidy for their sorting efforts and are 
charged for the remaining (i.e., post-sorting) waste.  Meanwhile, producers are obliged 
to pay in advance for the recycling costs for the (gross) waste produced in the form of a 
waste charge.  
Case 3-1c can be considered the least palatable to the general public because 
households must pay for the waste management cost and the recycling cost; hence, it is 
not consistent with the EPR principle.  This policy solution implies that consumers 
choose the optimal effort level x* because the policy maker induces them to integrate 
the full costs of recycling and waste disposal in their decisions.  
Even though consumers can be induced to choose the optimal sorting effort x*, 
the three policy mixes (3-1a), (3-1b) and (3-1c) may not be implementable in practice.  
As long as the decision about z is not left to the market, the policy maker will have to 
achieve the desired packaging waste reduction target by imposing z = z* on producers.  
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However, prohibitively high information, monitoring and enforcement costs render the 
direct control of the design effort impossible.  
 
3.2 Packaging design as a choice variable  
We now turn to a more general formulation of the model by relaxing the simplifying 
assumption that the policy maker can set z.  The packaging design can be taken into 
account as an additional driver for the overall amount of waste and, secondly, an 
additional policy channel for the policy maker in that the effort that producers spend on 
package design can be stimulated through policy interventions.  
The packaging design choice will now be treated as part of the producers’ 
optimisation problem.  Hence, all three variables that determine the amount of waste--
production and consumption q, sorting effort x, and design effort z--are controlled by 
the agents on the supply and demand side of the packaged good market, and their level 
will be determined jointly and endogenously in the model.  In this sense, decision 
making is fully decentralised now.  
The available set of policy instruments now consists of a sorting subsidy φ per 
unit of recyclables sorted, a waste charge τ or subsidy σ that that can be collected from 
either producers or consumers, and a product tax t or subsidy s per unit of the good.  
The producer’s maximisation problem now reads 
{ }q, z
Max  π  =  pq − C(q) − F(z)q + A;  A = − τ (1 − z)q  or  σzq   
Two different policy mixes can induce the desired outcome, as shown in Table 2.  The 
available policy strategies can be described as carrot (σ) or stick (τ).9  
                                                          
9 Both cases illustrate the Tinbergen principle (Tinbergen, 1967): each policy target is addressed by a 
single policy instrument. 
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[Table 2 here] 
 
Case 3-2a: the “carrot” case.   
The first-order conditions for the producers are  
πｚ =  − F′ (z)q + [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*]q  =  0    (7a) 
πq  =  p − C′ (q) − F(z) + [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*]z  =  0   (8a) 
while the consumers maximise 
{ }q, x
Max  u  =  U(q) + ω − pq − G(x)(1 − z)q + (γ  − d) x(1 − z)q  
− [G(x*) z* + (d − γ)x*z* + γ]q 
which yields 
ux  =  [− G′ (x) + (γ  − d)](1 − z)q  =  0     (9a) 
uq  =  U′ (q) − p + [−G(x) + (γ  − d)x](1 − z)     
− [G(x*) z* + (d − γ)x*z* + γ ]  =  0     (10a) 
(7a) yields (2), and (9a) yields (1).  In equilibrium (8a) and (10a) yield Condition (3).  In 
case 3-2a, producers are rewarded for their efforts to improve their packaging design 
through a subsidy σ, and consumers are rewarded for their sorting efforts through a 
subsidy φ.  In addition, a product tax t is imposed.  The need for directly subsidising 
producers’ efforts to reduce pollution through σ raises the question of whether this 
policy mix satisfies people’s perception of an EPR-driven regulation that is supposed to 
hold producers responsible.  As it is irrelevant for efficiency on which side of the 
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market t is imposed, assigning the statutory liability of the product tax to producers (and 
not consumers) may help to address this problem.10 
 
Case 3-2b: the “stick” case.   
The first-order conditions become  
 πｚ =  − F′ (z)q + [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*] q  = 0    (7b)   
 πq =  p − C′ (q) − F(z) − [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*](1 − z)  = 0  (8b) 
Meanwhile, consumers face 
{ }q, x
Max  u  =  U(q) + ω − pq − G(x)(1 − z)q + (γ  − d) x(1 − z)q  
+ [G(x*) + (d − γ) x*](1 − z*)q 
which yields 
 ux  =  [− G′ (x) + (γ  − d)](1 − z)q  =  0     (9b) 
uq  =  U′ (q) − p + [− G(x) + (γ  − d) x](1 − z) + [G(x*) + (d − γ)x*](1 − z*) 
=  U′ (q) − p  =  0       given (7b) and 9(b).    (10b) 
(7b) and (9b) yield Condition (2) and (1), respectively, and (8b) and (10b) yield 
Condition (3).  The optimal policy is represented by the combination of three 
instruments (following from the three FOCs).  On the one hand, producers must pay the 
waste charge τ  that will increase their marginal costs (to ensure that producers take 
account of the marginal external cost of waste generated by their product).  On the other 
hand, consumers are given subsidies for their sorting efforts φ (where the “reward” is 
equal to the marginal social (net) benefit of recycling).  In addition, the government 
pays a unit subsidy s for q (s can be interpreted a reward for producers' effort to reduce 
                                                          
10 EPR is an application of the Polluter Pays Principle. We refer to EPR throughout the paper as it is 
commonly used in the waste management context. Hence, assigning the statutory liability of the product 
tax to producers would align the solution with the Polluter Pays Principle.  
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waste which is equal to the marginal social (net) benefit of reduced waste).11  It has 
been pointed out that a tax on virgin resources should be combined with a subsidy for 
final goods to correct the inefficiently low level of production, consumption, and 
garbage (Palmer and Walls, 1994).  This model yields a qualitatively similar result for a 
tax on packaging waste.  On the one hand, in line with the idea of an EPR-driven 
regulation, producers must pay the waste charge.  But on the other hand, the public may 
resist the idea that consumption (or production) of polluting products are subsidised, 
making it politically difficult to implement such a subsidy in reality.   
Our results so far contrast with those of Choe and Fraser (1999), whose model 
also endogenises product/packaging design, output, and sorting effort.  There are two 
notable differences between their model and ours.  First, in their model it is assumed 
that both producers and household simultaneously choose the product/ packaging design 
(as is the case in Fullerton and Wu, 1998).  Second, we consider atomistic agents on 
both sides of the market, i.e. agents are price takers.  When buying a product, buyers 
face a take-it-or-leave-it offer for both the good itself and the packaging.12  Of course, 
the equilibrium price of the good is a function of the product design variable.  As 
demonstrated by the first-order conditions for both cases, the design variable z affects p 
through both producers’ and consumers’ decisions.  For producers, design efforts are 
costly but are also beneficial in view of the policy variables imposed (tax on waste or 
subsidy for the efforts made).  For consumers, the packaging design affects their waste 
                                                          
11 The sign depends on the sign of G(x*) + (d − γ) x*.  If we assume that the disutility of sorting is very 
high and γ relatively low, then G(x*) + (d − γ) x* > 0.  See the Appendix for more details. 
12 Another significant difference is that Choe and Fraser (1999) consider two policy instruments (a tax on 
gross waste and a waste charge on net waste) in choosing three variables.  We demonstrate that, following 
Tinbergen (1967), the first-best allocation is (theoretically) feasible, with the necessary number of policy 
instruments employed.  It can be shown that, with an additional policy instrument of a per-unit 
consumption subsidy for households, Choe and Fraser’s (1999) model (without illegal dumping) can yield 
the first-best allocation without giving the pricing power to firms or households, i.e., in a perfectly 
competitive market structure. 
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production, and in response to the policy variables (waste charge or sorting subsidy) 
they will adjust their consumption decisions, which affects the market price of the 
product. 
 Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium outcomes presented so far in a demand-supply 
context.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In both cases, the amount of recycled material is given by x*(1 − z*)q*.  The total net 
benefit generated by this market and the distribution of consumer versus producer 
surplus remain unchanged.  This means that, provided that the three policy instruments 
can be implemented, the additional policy target of optimal packaging design effort can 
be achieved without any efficiency loss or re-distributional consequences (within the 
partial equilibrium context).   
Notice that both policy options embody a form of a deposit-refund system.  The 
“carrot” policy mix is a deposit-refund system; the consumers of the packaged product 
pay the deposits, and then receive post-consumption refunds after sorting efforts have 
been made.  The “stick” policy mix can also be interpreted as a deposit-refund system, 
if the product subsidy is given to the producers (with τ being the deposit).   
Yet, the “carrot” and “stick” policies may be difficult to implement for political 
reasons.  The “stick” policy mix holds producers liable for waste generated, but it 
requires a consumption subsidy for the polluting good.  This is unlikely to appeal to the 
general public.  The “carrot” policy mix embodies what people normally consider a 
deposit-refund system, in that those who pay the deposits also receive refunds.  
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However, it requires a subsidy for producers and therefore may not correspond to the 
general public’s notion of an EPR-driven regulation.  Meanwhile, in contrast to the 
“stick” policy, the “carrot” policy does not require a consumption subsidy for the 
polluting good.  Instead, the polluting good is to be taxed, and shifting the statutory tax 
liability for the product tax to the producers may improve the acceptance of this policy 
by the general public.  Implementing either of the two optimal policies is therefore 
associated with a substantial challenge for the policy maker’s communication policy.  
This complication can easily be overlooked if the packaging design is not treated as a 
deliberate choice by the supply side of the market – as a comparison with the results 
derived in the previous subsection underscores. 
 
4 Unavailability of downstream instruments 
In the theoretical analysis we have assumed that a broad variety of policy instruments 
are available to the policy maker.  However, this may not be the case in reality.  For 
example, the policy maker may be unable to provide consumers with a sorting subsidy 
φ due to legal restrictions, high administrative cost, etc. How can the policy maker 
react? 
The model implies that on the one hand the policy maker could still induce the 
producers to choose the packaging design effort z* via a producer waste charge τ = 
G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*; on the other hand, the model also implies that without any 
subsidy consumers exert zero sorting effort.  
However, in reality, even without a sorting subsidy people sort waste to some 
extent, possibly because they derive utility from good acts.13 For example, Viscusi et 
                                                          
13 See Kinnaman (2006) for the summary of literature on recycling services and utility benefit.  
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al. (2011) report that in the US fifty eight per cent of the households living in states 
without any deposit-refund system still recycle eight or more out of ten bottles.  
Brekke et al. (2010) report that people take on recycling activities out of moral 
responsibility, though they view such activities as a burden.  Czajkowski et al. (2014) 
present evidence for Poland that households prefer to sort waste themselves over 
having their unsorted waste collected at no extra cost to be sorted at a specialised 
facility.  
Let us therefore assume that there is a default sorting level x0 that is executed 
by consumers at a given cost, for example out of a sense of moral duty.  By 
assumption, x0 < x*.  What is the likely outcome regarding the packaged good if 
consumers are willing to make the sorting effort x0?  Are we to produce and consume 
too much or too little?  Two opposing forces have to be considered.  On the one hand 
producers incur the additional cost of the waste charge, which pushes down the 
production of the polluting good.  On the other hand consumers are willing to exert a 
sorting effort up to x0.  The answer is provided in Figure 2. 
 
[Figure 2 here]  
 
The equilibrium outcome is given by (z, x, q) = (z*, x0, q’) where x0 < x*and q’ < q*.  
Without a policy instrument that affects households’ behaviour directly, any attempt to 
stimulate producers’ packaging design effort through a waste charge will lead to an 
inefficiently low level of production.  As pointed out in the previous section, an 
appropriately chosen (but potentially controversial) subsidy s per unit of the good can 
correct the inefficiently low level of production and consumption of the packaged 
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good, thus bringing the equilibrium to point E1, i.e., the optimal resource allocation.  
Yet, as discussed above, such a measure may be subject to considerable political 
implementation problems.  
An additional conclusion, which is of particular relevance for the UK for 
example, can be drawn.  Local authorities in the UK are not allowed by law to impose 
direct variable (volume- or weight-based) or fixed waste charges on households.14  Yet, 
the non-availability of waste charges as a policy instrument is innocuous with respect 
to the implementation of the first-best allocation.  The ability of British policy makers 
to reach the optimal waste allocation is therefore not impaired according to our model.  
 
5 Effects of a landfill tax 
The model in this paper can also be used to explore the effects of a landfill tax that has 
become a commonly observed waste management tool in Europe since the EU Landfill 
Directive of 1999.  A landfill tax can be understood as an increase in the operational 
cost of waste disposal and can therefore be captured by γ in this model.  The analysis of 
the model yields the expected results, that is, whichever policy mix (carrot or stick) we 
employ, it is straightforward to show that dz*/dγ > 0, dx*/dγ > 0, and dq*/dγ < 0 (see the 
Appendix).  In other words, an increase in the waste management costs due to a higher 
landfill tax results in increased sorting activities and design efforts together with 
reduced consumption of the good.15  
                                                          
14 Charging consumers directly for disposal costs may give rise to illegal waste disposal.  A disposal fee 
for consumers therefore may need to be combined with costly monitoring and prevention activities (see 
Choe and Fraser, 1999, and Ino, 2011, for waste reduction models that incorporate monitoring cost) or a 
better provision of waste treatment facilities.  Ichinose and Yamamoto (2011) point to the latter and report 
based on data for Japan that an increase in waste treatment facilities has a dampening effect on illegal 
dumping. 
15 An increase in γ can also be interpreted as an increase in the opportunity cost of landfill space, an 
interesting subject to explore for economies in which landfill space has become scarce (e.g., Europe). 
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However, this model can also be used to illustrate the mechanism behind a 
counter-intuitive proposition derived by Matsueda and Nagase (2012).  They show that 
an increase in the landfill tax rate could result in an increase in landfill waste if the 
landfill tax is implemented along with a mandatory recycling target.  This can be 
illustrated with the help of the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) 
Regulations (PWRegs), an EPR-driven regulation implemented in the UK in 1997.  
Under the PWRegs producers of packaged goods must purchase tradable credits called 
Packaging Recovery Notes (PRNs) from registered reprocessors as proof of their 
fulfilling the mandatory recycling target regarding packaging waste.   
Such a counter-intuitive result arises if an additional determinant for the 
parameter d is taken into account.  The model presented here implies that dz*/dd > 0, 
dx*/dd < 0, and dq*/dd < 0 (see the comparative static analysis for case 3-2 in the 
Appendix).  These results are intuitive, if an increase in d is interpreted as recycling 
activities becoming more costly; it stimulates producers’ packaging design efforts to 
reduce the recyclable waste but discourages consumers’ sorting efforts.  In addition, the 
higher reprocessing cost will reduce the production and consumption of the packaged 
good.  However, against the backdrop of the PWReg, d can be understood as being 
dependent on the price of the PRN (PPRN).  It can now be concluded that an increase in 
the landfill tax will reduce PPRN.  As intended, the benefit and therefore the volume of 
recycling activities grows after the tax on landfill waste has been raised.  This, however, 
will lead to a drop in PPRN due to the increase in supply of PRNs and hence a decrease 
in d (see Matsueda and Nagase, 2012).  Cheaper PRNs in turn will decrease production 
costs.  Therefore, an increase in the landfill tax will affect producers’ packaging design 
efforts negatively through its effect on PPRN and thus d and tend to increase the 
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production and consumption of the packaged good on the one hand.  On the other hand, 
a decrease in d stimulates consumers’ sorting efforts as discussed above.  The overall 
effect on the landfill waste, represented by (1 − x)(1 − z)q, depends on which effect 
dominates.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
The model in this paper extends the existing waste regulation literature by jointly 
endogenising producers’ packaging design effort, the production and consumption of 
the packaged good and households’ sorting effort as determinants of the overall amount 
of waste and possible targets for policy interventions.  
The model shows that two policy combinations can yield the optimal packaging 
waste management.  The consumers of the packaged product pay the product tax and 
are rewarded for their sorting efforts.  Producers on the other hand receive a reward 
(subsidy) for their packaging design effort without any penalty imposed on their 
activities.  This is likely to be inconsistent with the general public’s notion of an EPR-
based regulation so that the “carrot” policy mix may fail to win public support.  Making 
producers liable for the product tax may ameliorate such a negative view.  Under the 
“stick” policy mix, producers are held liable for the packaging waste generated; 
however, this policy mix requires a product subsidy for a polluting good, which may 
send a confusing signal to the general public.  In short, the theoretical policy solutions 
are one thing; implementation of these alternatives in reality is another. 
Similar complications arise if the set of available policy instruments is limited.  
Production and consumption of the packaged good are likely to settle on a sub-optimal 
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level if, for example, a sorting subsidy to households is not available due to 
administrative or legal reasons, as compensating measure may not attract enough 
support from the general public.  Redirecting sorting activities from households to other 
agents (e.g., reprocessors) may be a better solution in this case, especially as kerbside 
recycling programmes have to be run at high operating costs in general.16  Further 
complications can arise through the effect that changes in the landfill tax have on the 
volume of recycling activities.  In the presence of tradable credits that producers are 
obligated to acquire as evidence of packaging waste recycling, an increase in the landfill 
tax can actually give rise to more landfill waste. 
The model in this paper follows a static approach.  Complementing this study 
by modelling the dynamic effects of packaging design improvement is an interesting 
avenue for future research.  A better packaging design often means that not only less 
material is used.  It can also make it easier to de-assemble the package for recycling.  
Such a change is likely to result in a decrease in the disutility of sorting effort and an 
increase in the default sorting level over time.  Such dynamic effects may help explain, 
for example, why the UK has been successful in meeting its packaging waste recycling 
targets, despite the lack of a waste charge for or sorting subsidy to households.17     
  
                                                          
16 Empirical studies have found that curb-side recycling operations tend to incur net costs, and 
households’ demand for waste disposal is price-inelastic (Kinnaman, 2006).  Higher-income households 
are likely to be less inclined to exert sorting efforts and more likely to be willing to pay for alternative 
means (Huhtala, 2010).  Rewarding reprocessors for sorting and recycling activities have advantages 
such as lower transaction costs and better incentivizing of actual recycling (Walls, 2011). 
17 The regulated parties (sellers of packaged goods and providers of packaging services) are aware that 
whether they can achieve the recycling target imposed by the Defra depends critically on the level of x0.  
As early as 2005, Valpak expressed concerns about meeting the required targets due to the fact that 
recycling activities ultimately depend on local authorities’ recovery activities which depend on the sorting 
effort of households (Valpak, 2005).   
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Appendix 
Case 3-1a:  
The first-order conditions become  
πq  =  p − C′ (q) − F(z*) − γ (1 − z*)  =  0     (4a) 
 ux  =   [− G′ (x) + (γ − d)](1 − z*)q  =  0     (5a) 
uq  =  U′ (q) − p − [ − (γ − d)x + G(x)](1 − z*)  =  0    (6a) 
(5a) yields Condition (1).  (4a) and (6a) yield Condition (3), hence we obtain q = 
q*.  Consequently, (2) is satisfied as well. 
 
Case 3-1b:  
The first-order conditions become 
πq  =  p − C′ (q) − F(z*) − d (1 − z*)  =  0     (4b) 
 ux  =   [− G′ (x) + (γ − d)](1 − z*)q  =  0     (5b) 
uq  =  U′ (q) − p − [(γ − d)(1 − x) + G(x)](1 − z*)  =  0   (6b) 
(5b) yields Condition (1), and (4b) and (6b) yield Condition (3). 
 
Case 3-1c:  
The first order conditions become 
πq  =  p − C′ (q) − F(z*)  =  0       (4) 
ux  =   [− G′ (x) + (γ − d)](1 − z*)q  =  0     (5c) 
 uq  =  U′ (q) − p − [γ(1 − x*) + d x* + G(x*)](1 − z*)  =  0   (6c) 
(5c) yields Condition (1), and (4) and (6c) yield Condition (3). 
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Case 3-2:  
In equilibrium the following set of conditions hold: 
− F′ (z*) + [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*]  =  0,    
 − G′ (x*) + (γ  − d)  =  0, and 
 U′ (q*) − C′ (q*) − F(z*) − [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*](1 − z*)  =  0.  
Totally differentiating the three functions yields 
  
where the Jacobian matrix J is given by 
J  =    
and |J| < 0. (Note that this matrix is corresponds to the Hessian matrix of the social 
planner’s optimisation, hence it is a negative definite.)  The matrix J can be simplified 
to be: 
J  =  . 
Hence we have 
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  and 
 
( )1 **
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d Jd
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= <  
 
Sign of subsidy s for case 3-2b:  
s = [G(x*) + (d − γ) x*](1 − z*), so the sign of s depends on the sign of the expression in 
brackets, G(x*) + (d − γ) x*.  At the first-best allocation, G′ (x*)  =  γ  − d (see the figure 
below). 
 
If low sorting efforts (low values of  x) do not cause too much disutility, then G(x*) < (γ  
− d) x* will hold at x*.  Whereas, if the disutility of sorting G(x) is very high already for 
low values of x, then as shown above, we have G(x*) > (γ  − d) x*. 
  
( )( )1 1
0
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γ
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x 
x* 
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Figure 1. Packaged good market 
        p 
 
            S: Case 3-2b (stick)  
              p  =  C′ (q) + F (z*) + [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*](1 − z*)       
  
          
 
    
pstick      Estick            S: Case 3-2a (carrot)  
              p  =  C′ (q) + F(z*) − [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*] z* 
        
 
 G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x* 
    
         
 
pcarrot      Ecarrot                  D: Case 3-2b (stick) 
                p  =  U′ (q) 
 
         
 
                  D: Case 3-2a (carrot) 
               p  =  U′ (q) − [G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x*] 
 
 
 
  
            q*       q 
 
Note:  For 3-2a, D curve given by (10a) and S curve given by (8a). For 3-2b, D curve given by 
(10b) and S curve given by (8b).   
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Figure 2. Packaged good market – without a waste charge 
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Table 1.  Cases 3-1 
 
   Case 3-1a  Case 3-1b  Case 3-1c  
 
Demand side  φ = γ − d and τD = 0 φ = 0 and τD = γ − d τD = γ and φ = − d   
 
Supply side  τS = γ   τS = d   nothing 
            
 
 
 
Table 2. Cases 3-2  
 
   Case 3-2a (carrot σ)  Case 3-2b (stick τ)   
 
Demand side        φ = γ  − d  and    φ = γ  − d  and  
       t = G(x*) z* + (d − γ)x*z* + γ  s = [G(x*) + (d − γ) x*](1 − z*) 
       per unit q†   per unit q†   
 
Supply side        σ = G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x* τ = G(x*) + γ (1 − x*) + d x* 
     
            
† The product tax or subsidy can be imposed on either party in the product market. 
 
 
